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RESEARCHREPORTS

Report no. 99/2024

About Ukrainians in Poland and the War in Ukraine

Author: Jonathan Scovil
|
2024-10-10
Slightly more than half of Poles (53%) support Poland accepting Ukrainian refugees, which is the lowest result since the Russian invasion in February 2022. Shortly after the outbreak of the war, this percentage was much higher. In March 2022 it was 94% and for the next year it remained around 80%. However, in the spring of 2023, with the wave of reports of the so-called grain crisis related to the uncontrolled inflow of Ukrainian grain to the Polish market, it began to fall and, with short breaks, has been falling to this day. On the other hand, the share of opponents of accepting refugees from Ukraine is growing. They now constitute 40%, whereas in March 2022 the figure was only 3%.
Do you agree that Poland should accept Ukrainian refugees from the areas affected by the conflict?
Figure 1. Do you agree that Poland should accept Ukrainian refugees from the areas affected by the conflict?
Due to Ukraine's difficult situation on the front, related to, among other causes, the insufficient number of soldiers, the idea of ​​sending Ukrainian men of military age back to their homeland recurs in Polish public debate. This idea is supported by about two-thirds of Poles (67%), and only slightly over one-fifth of respondents (22%) are against it.
Should the Polish authorities send back to Ukraine male citizens of Ukraine of military age?
Figure 2. Should the Polish authorities send back to Ukraine male citizens of Ukraine of military age?
In August 2024, the Ukrainian army launched a surprise offensive on the Kursk region in Russia, quickly occupying over 1,000 sq. km of the territory of the Russian Federation. This surprising manoeuvre was intended to weaken Russia's ability to supply their army, draw some of its units away from the main combat area, and undermine their morale. However, many experts pointed to significant drawbacks of this move, such as stretching the front line and the risk of escalation of the conflict. Which of these perspectives prevails in Polish society? Poles' opinions on this issue are quite divided, but the dominant belief is that in the long term the Kursk offensive will prove beneficial for Ukraine (41%). The second most common response was "don't know" (32%), and only the third most common was a critical assessment of the operation (27%).
In August, the Ukrainian army retaliated by occupying part of Russia's territories in Kursk region. Will this move be beneficial for Ukraine in the long run or not?
Figure 3. In August, the Ukrainian army retaliated by occupying part of Russia
Some commentators have pointed out that the Kursk offensive and the Ukrainian occupation of part of Russian territory constitute another “red line” crossed that could prompt Moscow to use nuclear weapons. The Kremlin itself has recently introduced changes to its nuclear doctrine that would make such an attack more likely. What do Poles think about this threat? Our survey shows that about half (51%) fear that Russia could actually use nuclear weapons against Ukraine. It is worth noting that the level of these fears is systematically falling. When Vladimir Putin spoke of using nuclear weapons at the beginning of the war in Ukraine, his threats were treated much more seriously. The vast majority of Polish society (77%) feared this. Six months later, the level of these fears dropped significantly to 66%, and it has now fallen again by a sizeable degree.
Are you afraid that Russia might use nuclear weapons against Ukraine?
Figure 4. Are you afraid that Russia might use nuclear weapons against Ukraine?
At various stages of the war, the prevailing belief among Poles was that Ukrainians, with Western support, should continue to fight and not make any concessions to Russia. In the latest survey, this trend has continued, but the percentage of respondents supporting continuing the fight is the lowest ever recorded (46%), and the share of opposing voices, in favour of restoring peace even at the cost of territorial or political concessions on the part of Ukraine, has never been so high (39%).
Which view is closer to your own opinion?
Figure 5. Which view is closer to your own opinion?
We also asked Poles about their predictions regarding the end of the war, for the tenth time since its outbreak. Compared to all previous surveys, the current results indicate a pessimistic mood in Polish society. The belief that Ukraine will have to give up part of its territory clearly dominates (44%), and the percentage of optimists predicting the withdrawal of Russians from territories occupied by 2022, or even since 2014, has never been so low (19% and 6%, respectively). In addition, 4% of the respondents assume that Russia will subjugate all of Ukraine, and 27% chose the answer "don't know". These results suggest that the opinions of Poles were influenced to a greater extent by reports of the situation on the main sections of the front, which has been deteriorating for many weeks, than by triumphant reports from the Kursk offensive.
How do you think the war will end?
Figure 6. How do you think the war will end?
More information about this topic can be found in CBOS report in Polish: “About Ukrainians in Poland and the War in Ukraine", October 2024. Fieldwork dates for the sample: September 2024, N=941. The random sample is representative for adult population of Poland.