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## IN ADDITION

TO THE REPORTS REFERRED TO ABOVE,  
THE FOLLOWING HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED  
RECENTLY (IN POLISH):


- Public sentiment in September
- Attitude towards the government in September
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- What has been talked about recently?
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## Poland's security and trust in NATO

On the night of September 9-10, the Polish airspace was repeatedly violated by drones approaching from the east. For the first time in history, the Polish military, along with NATO allies, decided to neutralize them. In the days following this event, we asked Poles again about their sense of threat to the independence of our country and their confidence in the support from allies in the event of a threat to Polish borders.

Almost two-thirds of respondents (63%) believe that there is currently a threat to Poland's independence. This is the highest figure in the history of our surveys on this topic since February 1991. In contrast, just over a quarter of respondents (26%) disagreed. It is worth noting that in early May 2022, less than three months after the start of Russia's armed invasion of Ukraine, despite a clear increase in the sense of threat, opinions among Poles on this matter were very divided, with slightly more respondents expressing the view that Polish independence was not threatened (43% compared to 42% who were afraid).

Is there at present a threat to Poland's independence?




\*Survey by the National Security Bureau

It is noteworthy that earlier the situation was rated the worst in April 2014, after the "referendum" in Crimea and the annexation of the peninsula by the Russian Federation. At that time, 47% of respondents perceived a threat to Poland's independence, while 41% did not. The third time in the history of these surveys when respondents more often expressed the belief that there was a threat to Poland's independence than those who thought otherwise (44% to 33%) was in February 1991. At that time, Poland was still a member of the Warsaw Pact, Soviet troops were stationed in its territory, and the belief in the threat to independence was most often expressed by supporters of the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the formation of a military alliance with the West. Current survey results indicate that the perception of state security, especially the sense of threat to Poland's independence, is primarily linked to the activities of our largest eastern neighbour.

More than two-thirds (68%) of respondents believe that Poland can currently be confident in NATO allies' commitment to defend our borders in the event of a threat, although only 14% are firmly convinced of this. Less than a quarter (24%) of those questioned believe that such confidence cannot be held at this time, and 8% abstained from taking a position on this issue. Compared to the results from six months ago, the percentage declaring confidence in allies' commitment to defend our borders has increased by 7 percentage points, while the number of sceptics has decreased by 4 points.

**Poland's security is based on its membership in the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO). In your opinion, can Poland currently be certain of the involvement of its allies in the potential defence of our borders?**



Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

It is worth noting that in the previous measurement in March 2025, we recorded a significant decrease in the perceived confidence in NATO's commitment (a drop from 79% to 61%), which was likely related to statements by representatives of the current U.S. administration, who distanced themselves from unconditional commitment to defend allies. The current improvement in opinions, while statistically significant, has not offset this decline, most likely because while the majority of Poles positively assessed the response of European allies to the incursion of Russian drones into Polish airspace, nearly two-thirds believed that the U.S. response was insufficient. These data are discussed in more detail in the next segment.

More information about this topic can be found in CBOS report in Polish: "The security of Poland and the certainty of NATO", September 2025. Fieldwork dates for the sample: September 2025, N=969. The random sample is representative for adult population of Poland.

## Russian drones in Polish airspace


In light of the violation of Polish airspace by Russian drones, we decided to ask a few more detailed questions about these events. The majority (61%) positively assessed the response and actions of government authorities in the face of the threat, but only 15% rated them very positively, with the most common response being "rather good" (46%). Less than a third (31%) rated the response and actions of the authorities negatively, and 8% abstained from evaluation.

**Last week, there was a violation of Polish airspace by drones coming from the east. How do you evaluate the response to this event and the actions of government authorities?**




The majority of respondents (61%) believe that the Polish air defence system is not prepared for incidents like the one that occurred on the night of September 9-10 this year. In contrast, 31% disagree, and 8% are undecided on this issue.

**Do you agree the Polish air defence system is prepared for such incidents?**



More than half (51%) of respondents feel that the response of European NATO allies to the violation of Polish airspace by drones was sufficient. One-third (33%) consider it insufficient, and 15% abstained from evaluation. The response of the United States and President Donald Trump, however, was disappointing for most Poles, as 62% deemed it insufficient, while only one in five (20%) found it adequate.


**How do you evaluate the response of ...**



Percentages do not sum to 100 due to rounding.

Two-thirds of respondents believe that the violation of Polish airspace was the first step in a new phase of aggressive actions by Russia against Poland, while 16% think it was another incident of little significance. A relatively large group of people abstained from supporting either opinion (17%).

**Do you think last week's violation of Polish airspace was...**




More information about this topic can be found in CBOS Flash report in Polish: "Foreign drones in the Polish sky", September 2025. Fieldwork dates for the sample: September 2025, N=800. The quota sample is representative for adult population of Poland.

# Assistance to refugees from Ukraine and the ongoing war


Over the past six months, Polish attitudes towards Ukrainian refugees have worsened somewhat, following a clear downward trend observed with short breaks since mid-2023. The proportion of support for accepting them (48%) is the lowest, while the proportion opposing it (45%) is the highest since we began monitoring this issue, that is, since Russia's annexation of Crimea. The long-standing prevalence of support over opposition in the past decade now stands at only 3 percentage points.

## Do you agree that Poland should accept Ukrainian refugees from the areas affected by the conflict?



We also asked respondents to assess the scale of assistance that Poland offers to refugees from Ukraine. This question was regularly posed in 2022 and early 2023 and support for accepting Ukrainian refugees usually exceeded 80% at that time. Later on, we noted a clear decline in sympathy for Ukrainians. Considering this context, it is not surprising that we have seen a significant drop here as well. Compared to the last measurement from March 2023, i.e. two and a half years ago, the percentage of people considering the assistance provided to Ukrainians as adequate has decreased by 21 percentage points, from 67% to 46%. Currently, opinions that this assistance is too large prevail (50%, as compared to 26% in March 2023). Only 1% of respondents believe that the assistance is too small, although this percentage has never been very high, peaking at a maximum of 8% in May 2022.

## Do you think that the assistance our country offers to refugees from Ukraine is:




The majority of Poles still believe that in regard to the war in Ukraine, the primary goal should be to achieve peace, even if it means Ukraine has to give up part of its territory or independence, although the proportion of such declarations has slightly decreased from 58% in March to 54% currently. Conversely, there has been a slight increase in the proportion of those convinced of the necessity to continue the uncompromising fight against Russia (a rise from 25% in March to 28% currently), although the former position remains clearly dominant. In the early stages of the war, the support for continuing the fight was distinctly prevalent. However, since the beginning of the second year of the conflict, Poles' support for Ukrainian resistance has begun to wane. It seems that a fundamental change in sentiment was prompted by last year's presidential election victory of Donald Trump in the U.S., who announced a desire to limit support for Ukraine and seek to de-escalate the conflict. Nearly a year after those events and declarations, the war in Ukraine is still ongoing, and while the belief in the necessity of seeking peace at all costs has become somewhat less popular than six months ago, it is difficult to speak of a clear change.

## Which view is closer to your own opinion?



Polish predictions regarding the end of the war in Ukraine have undergone minor changes. The majority still assume that Ukraine will have to give up some of its territory. Such views began to clearly dominate in December, shortly after Donald Trump's electoral victory. However, the percentage of such opinions has slightly decreased over the last six months (a drop from 67% in March to 60% currently). Meanwhile, the proportion of optimistic forecasts for Ukraine (i.e. the belief that Russia will withdraw from territories occupied since 2022 or even 2014) has remained virtually unchanged (a total of 11% compared to 10% in March). However, the proportion of "don't know" responses has increased from 19% in March to 23% currently. One in twenty respondents, on the other hand, believes that Russia will subjugate all of Ukraine (5% compared to 4% six months ago).

## How do you think the war will end?




More information about this topic can be found in CBOS report in Polish: "Assistance to refugees from Ukraine and the further course of the war", October 2025. Fieldwork dates for the sample: September 2025, N=969. The random sample is representative for adult population of Poland.

## The Israeli-Palestinian conflict


The latest chapter in the conflict between Israel and Hamas-led Palestinian military groups, i.e. the war in Gaza, has been ongoing since October 2023. In March 2025, the ceasefire agreed upon in January of the same year was broken, and hostilities resumed. By early August, the Israeli army controlled approximately 75% of the Gaza Strip, and in that month, we asked Poles for their opinions on the conflict. According to 70% of respondents, it poses a threat to global security, with 31% perceiving it as a significant threat. Conversely, 19% of respondents held an opposing view. These results are very similar to those obtained in a survey conducted at the turn of November and December 2023, when 72% of respondents believed that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict threatened global security, while 19% disagreed.

### Do you agree that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict threatens global security or not?




A clear majority of respondents have a negative view of Israel's ambitions to gain full control over the Gaza Strip. Three-quarters of them believe that these ambitions are unjustified (75%), with 45% firmly convinced of this. Seventeen percent have no specific opinion on the matter.

### Do you agree that Israel's current military actions in Palestinian territories and its ambitions to gain control over the entire Gaza Strip are justified?



A large majority of Poles do not sympathize with either side of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (72%). Among those who sided with one of the conflicting parties, pro-Palestinian sympathies outnumber pro-Israeli sympathies by more than four times (18% vs. 4%). Interestingly, in a similar survey conducted at the turn of November and December 2023, among respondents who clearly sided with one of the conflict parties, pro-Israeli sympathies slightly prevailed (14% pro-Israel vs. 10% with a more favourable attitude towards the Palestinian side).

### Which side of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict do you sympathize with more?



The most support of the Palestinian side can be found among people living in large cities with populations of 500,000 or more (30%) as well as among those who identify their views as leftist (29%). People with the highest household incomes of at least 6,000 PLN per capita (39%) and those who do not participate in religious practices at all (29%) also more frequently sympathize with it.

More information about this topic can be found in CBOS report in Polish: "Public perception of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict", September 2025. Fieldwork dates for the sample: August 2025, N=917. The random sample is representative for adult population of Poland.

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