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IN ADDITION

TO THE REPORTS REFERRED TO ABOVE, THE FOLLOWING HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED RECENTLY (IN POLISH):

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- Assessments of the activities of Parliament and the President in February
- Party identification, alternative parties and negative electorates
- Polish willingness to cooperate
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- Public sentiment in February
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Attitude to other nationalities

For over three decades, we have been studying Poles' attitudes towards other nationalities, trying to determine which of them are favoured and which are viewed with dislike. In this year's survey, we have asked about attitudes towards 21 nationalities and ethnic groups. Similar to last year, Italians rank first in the list of the most liked peoples, with nearly six out of ten Poles (58%) expressing sympathy, while only 7% show dislike. A slightly lower percentage of Poles have a positive attitude towards Czechs (55%). Every second respondent likes Slovaks (52%), while nearly half have favourable views of English (49%) and Americans (47%). Over two-fifths of respondents express sympathy for Croats (45%), Swedes, French, and Dutch (44% each), as well as Lithuanians (43%) and Hungarians (41%).

Further down the list of the most liked nationalities are Bulgarians and Germans (35% each). However, it is worth noting that dislike for Germans is declared twice as often as for Bulgarians (32% vs. 16%). One-third of Poles have a positive attitude towards the Vietnamese (33%), with a slightly lower percentage liking the Chinese (30%).

Attitude to other nationalities.



Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding

Subsequent positions in the ranking are occupied by nationalities and ethnic groups for which declarations of dislike are more common than declarations of sympathy: Ukrainians (29% vs. 43%), Palestinians (24% vs. 30%), Jews (22% vs. 40%), Belarusians (19% vs. 46%), and Roma (18% vs. 46%). Since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, we have consistently approached Russians with the greatest distance, with 74% of respondents expressing dislike and only 7% showing sympathy.

A year ago, we recorded a deterioration in attitudes towards many nationalities. This year, the changes are somewhat less clear-cut, but we have observed more frequently decline, rather than an increase in sympathy. The most significant increase in dislike is recorded in attitudes towards Jews (an

increase of 8 percentage points, with a simultaneous decrease in sympathy of 4 points) and Americans (increase in dislike of 8 points, decrease in sympathy of 11 points), as well as Ukrainians (increase in dislike of 5 points, decrease in sympathy of 1 point).

Average ratings on the sympathy-antipathy scale for selected nationalities; Averages measured on a scale from -3 (maximum antipathy) to +3 (maximum sympathy)
Excluding declarations of indifference



Further increases in dislike concern the English (up by 3 percentage points, decrease in sympathy of 1 point), Roma (increase in dislike of 3 points), and Russians (increase in dislike of 2 points, decrease in sympathy of 1 percentage point). Compared to the previous measurement, we have also noted a slight increase in dislike for the Chinese (by 2 points), but with a simultaneous increase in sympathy (also by 2 points). This is the third consecutive year in which Poles' attitudes towards peoples which clearly gained in our eyes immediately after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, i.e. Americans, the English, and Ukrainians, have deteriorated.

Aside from the aforementioned Chinese, we can also note increased sympathy for Slovaks (up by 4 points), French (increase in sympathy of 2 points, decrease in dislike of 4 points), Germans (increase in sympathy of 2 points, level of dislike unchanged), and Palestinians (increase in sympathy of 2 percentage points, decrease in dislike by 4 points).

It is also worth noting that this year we have registered a deterioration in attitudes towards most of Poland's neighbours. If we look at the average indications, the exceptions are Slovaks and Germans with slight increases of 0.04 and 0.02, respectively. The Czechs remain in first place in terms of sympathy, similar to last year, followed by Slovaks in second, and Lithuanians in third. Fourth place is occupied by Germans, towards whom our attitude is quite ambivalent, while Ukrainians are fifth. Belarusians occupy sixth place, while Russians are last. We approach them with the greatest dislike.

Changes in attitude to Poland's neighbours. Average values on the scale from -3 (max. antipathy) to +3 (max. sympathy).



More information about this topic can be found in CBOS report in Polish: "The attitude of Poles towards other nations", February 2026. Fieldwork for national sample: January 2026, N=938. The random sample is representative for adult population of Poland.

Trust in foreign politicians

In the February survey, we asked our respondents to express their attitudes towards the most important European and world leaders. Out of twelve politicians included in the study, only four had more trust than distrust. The most trusted is Volodymyr Zelensky, with nearly half of all respondents (49%) expressing a positive attitude. More than one-third declare trust in Emmanuel Macron (36%) and Giorgia Meloni (35%). However, the French president encounters distrust nearly twice as often as the Italian prime minister (27% vs. 14%). Keir Starmer also elicits more positive than negative attitudes (16% trust and 11% distrust), although he is the least recognized leader among those on our list: 55% of all respondents do not recognize him.

The others included in the study more often evoke negative than positive reactions. Vladimir Putin (91% distrust) and Alexander Lukashenko (86%) are clearly viewed negatively. More than half of respondents declare distrust towards Donald Trump (56%), Viktor Orbán (53%), and Benjamin Netanyahu (53%). While the leaders of the United States and Hungary have a group of supporters (25% and 18%, respectively), nearly no one trusts the Israeli prime minister (4%). Distrust also prevails towards Ursula von der Leyen (43% distrust vs. 31% trust declarations), Friedrich Merz (24% vs. 17%), and Xi Jinping (32% vs. 10%).

Attitudes towards politicians active on the international stage (February 2026)



We also asked about the attitudes towards seven of the twelve politicians in 2022, shortly after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. We have now noted clear changes in attitudes towards three of them. The most significant changes occurred in the credibility of Volodymyr Zelensky. In July 2022, trust in the leader of Ukraine was nearly universal, reaching 86%. Over three and a half years, it has decreased by 37 percentage points, while declared distrust has increased by 24 points. Despite these unfavourable changes, as mentioned above, Volodymyr Zelensky remains the best-rated foreign politician. During the analysed period, Ursula von der Leyen has also significantly lost in public perception. The percentage of those expressing trust in the head of the European Commission has decreased by 15 points since July 2022, while the proportion voicing their distrust has increased by 23 points. In contrast, Emmanuel Macron has seen a significant increase in his credibility over the past three and a half years. The percentage of those trusting him has increased by 9 points, while the relative number of people expressing distrust has decreased by 12 points.

Attitudes towards politicians active on the international stage (February 2026 and July 2022)



More information about this topic can be found in CBOS report in Polish: "Trust in foreign political leaders", February 2026. Fieldwork for national sample: February 2026, N=967. The random sample is representative for adult population of Poland.

European integration

Attitudes towards Poland's presence in the European Union have remained practically unchanged since July 2025. Support for Poland's EU membership is expressed by 82% of respondents, while 14% oppose it. The highest level of approval for Poland's membership in the EU was noted in June 2022, when 92% supported it and only 5% opposed it.

Attitudes towards Poland's EU membership



Currently, 38% of Poles express the belief that EU membership excessively restricts the sovereignty of our country (6 percentage points less than two years ago), while half (50%, an increase of 7 points since 2024) disagree. Concerns related to the reduction of Poland's sovereignty primarily involve agriculture and agricultural policy, as well as the environment and climate protection and energy transformation.

Which view is closer to your own opinion?



Since 2022, approval for deepening European integration has clearly decreased. Currently, Poles are more divided in their opinions on the desired direction of changes in the EU. Similar percentages advocate for deepening integration (26%) and for increasing the role of nation-states (23%) or even for Poland's exit from the EU (5%). Nearly one-third (32%) would like to maintain the status quo.

Which of these possible visions of Poland's and the European Union's future is best from your own perspective?



The percentage of supporters of Poland's exit from the EU in our society is small, but the option of a potential Polexit occasionally resurfaces in public debate, especially in social media. In this regard, we asked respondents about their expectations regarding the consequences of such a scenario. We used the social assessment of the effects of Brexit as a reference point. The example of the United Kingdom rather discourages Poland from following a similar path. In public opinion, the UK has rather lost (46%) than gained (10%) from leaving the European Union. The remaining respondents believe that this move brought the UK as many gains as losses (22%), or, equally frequently, could not assess its effects (22%). The consequences of a hypothetical exit by Poland from the EU are viewed even more negatively: almost two-thirds (62%) expect that the effects of such a decision would be rather negative, while only nearly one in ten (9%) sees mainly benefits associated with it. The equal balance of gains and losses is predicted by 16% of respondents.

In your opinion, did the UK's exit from the European Union bring it ...



Would Poland's exit from the European Union bring our country...



More information about this topic can be found in CBOS report in Polish: "Poles on European integration", February 2026. Fieldwork for national sample: January 2026, N=938. The random sample is representative for adult population of Poland.

SAFE program

The majority of respondents (52%) support Poland's participation in the EU SAFE program, which would allow it to take out a low-interest loan for the purchase of military equipment, particularly that produced in Europe. However, this solution has a significant group of opponents (35%). Only 8% declare that they have not heard of this program at all.

Do you support Poland's participation in the EU SAFE program, under which our country would receive a low-interest loan for the purchase of military equipment, especially that produced in Europe?



Those who have heard about SAFE were asked about the expected effects of Poland's participation in this program, which could serve as arguments for or against participation in it. Declarations confirm that the program raises significant controversy. The most apparent expected result of participation in SAFE is the development of the Polish arms industry: 61% of those who have heard of the program indicate this. However, nearly one-third of respondents (30%) do not believe that the funds from the program will contribute to the development of Polish companies, and thus do not believe that, as the government assures, they would be significantly spent inside the country. Almost half (47%) believe that the loan from the SAFE program is favourably priced, but a significant group questions this (28%), and one in four (25%) cannot assess it. More than half (51%) share concerns that participation in SAFE excessively binds Poland to the European Union. However, nearly as many people (43%) do not see such a threat. The impact of participation in SAFE on relations with the United States is also assessed ambiguously, although the prevailing opinion is that joining the program would not harm Polish-American relations (44% compared to 38% expressing the opposite view).

There are various opinions on Poland's participation in the SAFE program. In your opinion, would the SAFE program loan for military purposes...

Responses of people who have heard of the SAFE program



More information about this topic can be found in CBOS Flash report in Polish: "On Poland's participation in the SAFE program", March 2026. Fieldwork for national sample: February 2026, N=1000, CATI and CAWI interviews. The sample is representative for adult population of Poland.

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