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NORPOL - NORWEGIAN-POLISH COOPERATIVE PROJECT "TRENDS AND RECONFIGURATIONS IN POLISH PUBLIC THOUGHT"


NORPOL is an international research project, the main goal of which was to provide Norwegian support for Polish social survey research on public opinions, attitudes, values, their configurations and changes over time. This has been accomplished with appreciation of the Polish and Norwegian strengths in social research, and a strong sense of partnership. The project was funded by the Research Council of Norway, and administered by Prof. Albert Simkus through the University of Tromsø and the Norwegian University of Science and Technology in Trondheim. Polish project partners included CBOS Public Opinion Research Center, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences and Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences. In May 2004, Polish Public Opinion presented some results from the first stage of the project, concerning unemployment, industrial relations, populism and xenophobia. The present volume is more diversified thematically and integrates data from different parts of the project in order to analyze the dynamics of attitudinal change in Poland.


ATTITUDES TO DEMOCRACY

In established free-market democracies, satisfaction with the current functioning of democratic institutions is usually weakly correlated with support for democracy as an ideal political system. In Poland, satisfaction with the current state of democracy is about 20 per cent points lower now than support for the democratic political system in general.


Moreover, while satisfaction with democracy varies substantially in time, depending on the political situation, support for it is much more stable, i.e., independent of current affairs.

Pro-democratic attitudes are less pronounced when the options concerning democracy as the best system are not limited to "yes" and "no", but include such opinions as "democracy is always the best", "undemocratic systems are sometimes better" and "it does not matter for people like me". A little more than a third of the Poles still agree that democracy is always the best system, while for another third it is of no importance. The opinion that an undemocratic system may be acceptable in some circumstances is expressed by no more than one fifth of the respondents. These opinions have not changed very much in time, although a slow but systematic growth of pro-democracy attitudes has been noted since 2003.






Poland regained parliamentary democracy more than twenty years ago, enough time to form an opinion about good and bad sides of the democratic system. In recent polls, about half of the Poles thought the system to be good and in no need of change or in need of only limited improvement. Slightly less people believed that it needed to be changed.





Supporters of democracy as a superior political system are at the same time the strongest supporters of the current Polish system. Only a third advocates far reaching changes of the system, while such changes are seen as necessary by more than a half of those who accept undemocratic systems.



While their frequency demonstrates negligible change in time, authoritarian attitudes indicated by a readiness to accept undemocratic systems are quite unstable. The attitudinal stability is measured after disregarding all "don't know" answers, i.e., including only the true opinion holders in the analysis, and after aggregating pro-democracy and neutral opinions.

Authoritarianism was expressed by 18.6% of opinion holders in the first wave of the panel in January 2004 and by 15.3% in the third wave in January 2005. However, only 3.9% opinion holders (one fifth of the initial number) have expressed the same authoritarian attitude in all three panel waves.




Opinions concerning the system currently operating in Poland appear to be more stable. While those who approve it or suggest only some modifications but not a general change constituted 49.8%, 51.5% and 53.4% of opinion holders in respective panel waves, as many as 27% (more than half of the initial number) held such an attitude across all three waves.

Krzysztof Zagórski

SYSTEM CHANGE EVALUATION


System change after 1989, often referred to as the transformation, has been strongly supported by Polish

society. Satisfaction with the new system peaked in 1995, when three-fourths of the Poles expressed a positive opinion, and only one in six thought the changes had not been worthwhile. This enthusiasm has weakened significantly since then, but a clear majority still approves the change of the system.




Recent years have seen a surge in support for the transformation in Poland. Almost two-thirds of the Poles are presently convinced that it was worthwhile to have changed the system, while only a fifth is of the opposite opinion.

General acceptance of system change far surpasses people's opinion of the resultant gains and losses, in similarity to democratic attitudes, presented in the previous chapter, where general support for democracy is high as compared to the evaluation of its current functioning.



The first years of political and economic reform drew the heaviest criticism as far as weighing benefits against losses is concerned. In 1994, the number of people convinced that citizens had suffered more than they had benefited from the transformation was almost three times higher than the number of those believing in its predominantly beneficial character. The perceived gains and losses balance was positive in 1996-98, but has deteriorated since. The 2001 can be seen as a critical year, when for the first and only time the majority was convinced that the undergoing changes were bringing

people more losses than benefits. Although opinions improved substantially in the following years, still a negative view of the effects of system change prevails.



While most Poles do not consider themselves as beneficiaries of the transformation, only one in five (19%) would like the socialist system to return. Two-thirds (65%) do not miss the past system and only every sixth have no opinion.

Rafał Boguszewski


ASSESSMENT OF SOCIALISM

To assess long-term and short-term stability and change in Poles' opinions about socialism, two studies employed the same question: "Do you think that the socialist system brought to the majority of people in Poland: (1) gains only, (2) more gains than losses, (3) as many gains as losses, (4) more losses than gains, or, (5) losses only?" Since a clear-cut distinction between outlooks on the past is more straightforward, the five-choice answer was regrouped into three categories: *positive assessment* of socialism ('gains only' & 'more gains than losses'); *neutral assessment* ('as many gains as losses'); and *negative assessment* ('more losses than gains' & 'losses only'). First, the POLPAN study focused on long-term public opinion change; for the basic distribution of assessment of socialism, we added information from the NORPOL data set. Second, the POLTEST study examined short-term change.

Long-Term Public Opinion Change: 1988-2003

Despite an overall stability in positive evaluations of socialism over the 1988-2003 period, significant change occurred at the individual level.

From 1988 to 2003, the proportion of Poles holding a positive view of the past did not diminish; if anything, positive answers became more common. There was a decrease in the proportion of neutral responses, while negative assessment first increased (from 1988 to 1998, Table 1), and then decreased slightly (from 1998 to 2003). Comparative data for 2005 demonstrated a further decrease in the proportion of neutral responses, but also a slight increase in the proportion of negative assessment.



What is the meaning of these results, considering the dynamics of public opinion? Responses across a five-years interval reveal a considerable degree of stability (coefficients vary from 39 to 58%), but also substantial change in how Poles evaluate the past socialist regime (Table 1).

Table 1: Changes in Assessment of Socialism in the Periods 1988-1993, 1993-1998, and 1998-2003.

Assessment of Socialism:	Assessment of Socialism ^a			N=100%
	Positive	Neutral	Negative	
	Percent of Persons			
In 1988	Changes between 1988-1993 ^b			
Positive	38.8	37.2	24.0	363
Neutral	27.5	40.4	32.1	582
Negative	23.4	34.6	42.0	295
In 1993	Changes between 1993-1998 ^c			
Positive	50.5	31.4	18.1	370
Neutral	29.0	45.8	25.2	472
Negative	22.1	27.4	50.5	398
In 1998	Changes between 1998-2003 ^d			
Positive	57.6	24.3	18.1	403
Neutral	39.5	43.3	17.2	430
Negative	22.3	28.6	49.1	381


^a Changes are examined on the POLPAN panel sample, consisting of people interviewed in 1988, 1993, 1998, and 2003.

^b Gamma=0.215; ^c Gamma=0.396; ^d Gamma=0.431

In the years following system change in Poland, one fifth of the respondents switched from a negative to a positive assessment of socialism. Reverse switching, from positive to negative, has also occurred, but after 1993 it has remained constantly lesser than changes to the positive. Moreover, the proportion of people who initially held a neutral view on socialism but have switched to a positive one has increased with the passage of time.

To what extent are previously held opinions about the past related to later assessments? Is this relation equally strong across time? The correlation coefficients for the four survey waves indicate a positive, significant relationship between assessment of socialism at time t and at time $t+1$; that is, more positive evaluations of the past at one particular point are associated with more positive evaluations at the subsequent survey wave. When five-year periods are considered, the strength of

the relationship increases at first (the correlation coefficient for the 1993 & 1998 evaluations is twice that for 1988-1993), and then stabilizes.



If, on the other hand, the relation between earlier and later evaluations is considered over the entire 1988-2003 interval, the strength of the correlation decreases as more time passes between peoples' answers.

Short-Term Public Opinion Change: March April 2004, April 2004 March 2005, & March 2004 March 2005¹.

Results in Table 4 indicate considerable stability in public opinion, especially for the one month interval. In general, the stability coefficients are slightly higher (varying between 52 and 66 percent) than those for POLPAN (Table 2), suggesting that over shorter time periods Poles are less likely to modify their views of the past.

Table 2. Short-term Changes in Assessment of Socialism: March - April 2004, April 2004 - March 2005, and March 2004 - March 2005.

Assessment of Socialism:	Assessment of Socialism ^a			N=100%
	Positive	Neutral	Negative	
	Percent of Persons			
In March 2004	Changes between March - April 2004 ^b			
Positive	61.3	28	10.7	261
Neutral	20.1	65.6	14.3	244
Negative	14.5	23	62.4	165
In April 2004	Changes between April 2004 - March 2005 ^c			
Positive	51.9	30.5	17.6	233
Neutral	17.7	58.7	23.6	271
Negative	18.1	26.5	55.4	166
In March 2005	Changes between March 2004 - March 2005 ^d			
Positive	52.1	33.7	14.2	261
Neutral	17.2	58.6	24.2	244
Negative	12.7	26.1	61.2	165

^a Changes are examined on the CBOS panel sample.

^b Gamma=0.643; ^c Gamma=0.480; ^d Gamma=0.582

This does not mean that change is absent: over the first month, about 15% of respondents switched from


a negative to a positive assessment of socialism, and about 11% changed their opinion in reverse direction. Such change is present across all three survey waves, although in different amounts, and in different direction. For example, over the first month more people have moved from a negative to a positive evaluation of the past than the other way round. The proportion of change from positive to negative and from negative to positive is almost identical for the April 2004 - March 2005 interval, while for the March 2004-March 2005 period, slightly more persons have switched from a positive view to a negative one than in reverse. Also, the first month aside, more people have switched from a neutral view to a negative rather than a positive one.

Irina Tomescu-Dubrow, Kazimierz M. Słomczyński


¹For this analysis, data came from a three-wave panel survey (March 2004, N=1458; April 2004, N=767; March 2005, N=767) on a national representative sample of adults in Poland. Altogether, 665 people took part in all three waves. The CBOS panel data set asks people to evaluate socialism using the same questionnaire item as POLPAN.

LEFT-RIGHT: CONFIGURATIONS OF UNDERSTANDING AND ATTITUDES


The left-right dimension is commonly used to describe the political scene, values, attitudes, political parties, their programs etc. Despite its common use, many people from both well established and newly regained free-market democracies find it difficult to understand the meaning of what is the left and what is the right. and are frequently unable to define their own political preferences in these terms. As many as a fourth of Poles cannot place themselves on the left-center-right continuum. This is a large number, albeit not larger than found in many democratic countries all over the world. Of those who can self-identify themselves as leftists, centrists and rightists, centrists are the most numerous (about one third of the total population). It is difficult to say, however, how often people choose the center because they have trouble identifying their opinions. The group of self-declared rightists (25.8%) is substantially greater than the leftist group (15.0%) in Poland.



Political scientists distinguish at least two independent and uncorrelated dimensions of the left-right ideological division, namely economic and socio-political. Multivariate factor analysis of NORPOL data has resulted in distinguishing five independent sets of political issues located by the public on the left-center-right continuum (from 1 extreme left, through 2 left, 3 center, 4 right, to 5 extreme right). Such uncorrelated dimensions as “protectionism and welfare state”, “family and nation”, “ideological and cultural liberalism” and “social liberalism” were distinguished on of the grounds of correlations between location of particular items on the scale. Mean values of all items on the left-center-right scale, computed for each set of issues forming a particular dimension, have demonstrated a predominantly correct understanding of the left and the right by the public. However, all means are close to the scale's center (3), indicating that a relatively large number of people either misplace issues on the scale or define them as centrist.



GROUPING THE "LEFT-RIGHT" ITEMS ACCORDING TO THEIR ACCEPTANCE^{b)}



^{b)} Factors obtained by rotated principal component solution. Values above 3 indicates the acceptance.

Source: POLTEST 2005

A different picture is revealed by a multivariate analysis based on acceptance or rejection of particular social and economic attitudes, rather than on their identification as left or right. The first dimension includes social issues which may be interpreted as indicators of nationalism (commonly treated as part of rightist ideology) and egalitarianism together with etatism (commonly treated as part of leftist ideology). It means that people socially and politically on the right have often leftist economic attitudes. Economic liberalism, social liberalism and anti-union attitudes form three different and quite separate dimensions, the location of which on the left-right scale is not undisputable. Much less undisputable is the ideological location of traditionalism and pro-church attitudes, which constitute yet another dimension.


Janina Frentzel-Zagórska
Krzysztof Zagórski

PERCEPTION OF CONFLICTS


Over the transition years there has been a pronounced increase in perceived intensity of conflicts in the Polish society. The percentage of those who perceive existing conflicts as very strong has been rising consistently. Between years 1993 and 2004 the percentage of those considering conflicts between the rich and the poor to be very strong has increased from 15% to 24%. For conflicts between managers and supervisees subordinates the change was from 8% in 1993 to 15% in 2003, and for conflicts between firm company owners and employees it was from 11% in 1993 to 24% in 2004. Except for conflicts between the rich and the poor, there has also been an increase in the number of those seeing conflicts as "strong" (i.e. moderately strong) over the analyzed time period, while with respect to all three conflicts the number of those perceiving them as "weak" has remained fairly constant. Finally, the share of those seeing practically no conflicts has shrunk over eleven years from 7-10% to 3-4% and over these years there has also been a substantial drop in the percentage of "do not know" answers given to questions about conflicts between managers and supervisees subordinates and between firm company owners and employees.

DO YOU THINK THAT CONFLICTS BETWEEN RICH AND POOR (MANAGERS AND SUPERVISEES, FIRM OWNERS AND EMPLOYEES) ARE VERY STRONG, SOMEWHAT STRONG, SOMEWHAT WEAK, OR THERE ARE PRACTICALLY NO CONFLICTS? PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTIONS OF ANSWERS IN A GIVEN YEAR.


CONFLICTS BETWEEN RICH AND POOR ARE



CONFLICTS BETWEEN MANAGERS AND SUPERVISEES ARE



CONFLICTS BETWEEN FIRM OWNERS AND EMPLOYEES ARE



Legend: very strong (red), somewhat strong (orange), somewhat weak (green), practically no conflicts (dark green), do not know (yellow)


Population aged 26-70 in respective years.

Source: POLPAN, POLTEST


Does this shift in distributions mean, for example, that there is a growing group of people who perceive existing conflicts in a systematic relationship to changes in objective conditions and do not change their opinions over prolonged periods of times unless these

conditions change? Or is it rather than that people change their opinions about the intensity of conflicts quite freely over years and months and, in consequence, any time-specific aggregate distribution of opinions is no more than a temporary arrangement of idiosyncratic and fluid individual opinions and could have been quite different (even under conditions of no objective change), had the measurement been taken just a year or just a month earlier or later? The analysis below suggest that the relationship between objective changes and individual attitudinal levels might be far from clear in Poland.

Five-year stability of answers in the category of “very strong conflicts” has usually been no higher than around one-third. The only exception is a greater stability in perception of conflicts between firm company owners and employees over the years 1998 and 2003. The fact should be stressed that one-month stability in perception is not much higher than five-year stability. In case of conflicts between managers and supervisees subordinates and conflicts between owners and employees, there are even instances in which one-month stability is lower or equal to a five-year one! Obviously, there is huge amount of fluidity in individual perceptions of social conflicts even over very short periods of time. This is an additional argument for the lack of patterned stability in individual opinions. In two cases (managers and supervisees subordinates as well as owners and employees), ten-year stability is higher than at least one five-year stability. In addition, for the conflict between the rich and the poor, the 1993-2003 stability is almost the same as the 1998-2003 one.



Inspecting Pearson correlation coefficients in Table 3 leads to similar conclusions. Although one-month stabilities in this analysis are clearly higher than five- or ten-years ones, their magnitude is definitively not impressive--it ranges from .41 to .46. What is most interesting in Table 3 is how weak, scattered and unsystematic POLPAN results are. Correlations range from .05 to .24 and display different patterns. To name some of these patterns: ten-year stability being higher than a five-year one (rich and poor), ten-year stability being close to nonexistence (owners and employees), 1993-1998 stability being higher, lower or equal to 1998-2003 one (rich and poor, managers and superviseessubordinates, and owners and employees respectively.)




This raises some doubts, if as to whether perceptions of conflict analyzed can be easily treated as a systematic, well-developed, reality-responsive attitudes on the part of the Polish population--and this again makes the relation between changes on aggregate and individual levels complex and difficult to answer unequivocally.

Bogdan Mach


POLITICAL TOLERANCE AND INTOLERANCE

NORPOL survey questions focused on opinions whether various extreme political groups should be allowed to arrange public meetings and participate in radio and TV programs. Respondents were shown a list of various extreme groups and asked, i.a., which of these should be prevented from engaging in the said public activities. Thus, the focus was on measuring intolerance as a concept opposite to tolerance.



Ranking of various groups in terms of a lack of political tolerance to their public meetings is quite similar to the ranking in terms of disagreement to their appearance in the media. About 70% of Poles expressed unwillingness to have “Nazis” organize public meetings and a similar number was against allowing them to appear on TV or radio. “Racists” followed closely, being picked by about 65 percent in both cases. The third group indicated were “Muslim fundamentalists”, mentioned by more than a third of the respondents. About 20 percent of opinion holders were unwilling to allow “Communists” to arrange public meetings. Less than 10 percent were of the opinion that all groups should be allowed the two activities. Very few Poles would not allow “Conscientious objectors” to have public meetings or to appear on radio and TV. More surprisingly perhaps, only 1 out of 8 respondents would not give the said political rights to “Right extremists”.


Another methodological approach is to estimate the levels of intolerance only with regard to groups most disliked by the respondents. People expressing the strongest dislike of a given group were asked whether this group should or should not be allowed to organize public meetings and to appear on radio and TV. The ranking achieved in this way differed from the previous one. “Muslim fundamentalists” and “Nazis” appeared at the top of the list. Above 90% of those who picked them as the most disliked group would not allow them to organize public appearances. Next in line were the “Racists” with almost 90% of the indications, followed by “Right extremists” with 80%, and the “Communists” and “Left extremists”. Thus, more people disliking “Muslim fundamentalists” opposed their public appearances than those with anti-communist feelings opposed similar appearances by the communists. However, the ranking by percentage of those disliking a given group the most was almost identical with that obtained by the first method.



Kristen Ringdal
Krzysztof Zagórski


“POLE - CATHOLIC”: POLISH RELIGIOUSNESS

The expression “Pole-Catholic” is more than stereotypical for it reflects the impact faith has on shaping Polish identity. An overwhelming majority of Poles (94%) are declared Roman Catholics. Not many less (86%) claim that faith in God is important in their lives. About two-thirds feel a closeness to God, and most of these experience this closeness very strongly.




Participation in religious practices is common in Poland. Most respondents (58%) take part in religious service or other practices at least once a week; every sixth respondent (18%) admits taking part one to three times a month, just as many (17%) perform religious practices merely a few times a year. Less than a tenth declares permanent absence.

Despite extremely high religiosity and strong attachment to ancestral faith, Polish people demonstrate a high selectivity of religious beliefs.



Belief in God is unquestioned (90%), but the existence of heaven is not so obvious less than three-fourths (73%) believe in it. 70% of the respondents declare strong belief in life after death and almost two persons in three (65%) believe in meeting loved ones after death. Not many more than half of the respondents are convinced that hell exists (56%) and a very similar

number believes in the existence of the devil. Beliefs concerning the importance of baptism are the most diversified. The prevailing conviction is that this sacrament alone is not sufficient to open the way to heaven - 37% respondents. On the other hand, 30% claim that baptism is a necessary condition of salvation and that unbaptized people cannot go to heaven at all.




Of the 92% believers, little more than a half (48%) declare full agreement with all of the teachings of their religion. A similar number expresses the doubts about some religious teachings.

Rafał Boguszewski


GENDER ROLES

Ideas about gender role division in Polish society are markedly different depending on the sphere in question. Overall, a household division of duties based on equality is preferred, and improvement of women's position on the job market is desired. When it comes to the "softer" dimension, that is, masculine and feminine lifestyle, cross-gender behavior is frowned upon.

Polish society tends to opt for a household division of duties based on partnership. A vast majority supports increased participation of men in household chores. The majority reject men's control of financial affairs and disagree with the idea that a woman earning more than her husband is bound to cause problems.




Women tend to opt for a model based on the principle of partnership more often than men.




Polish society as a whole largely accepts the father and mother fulfilling interchangeable roles, and believes that a woman's career does not rule out finding fulfillment in motherhood. People tend to agree that a single father can do just as good a job of raising a child as a single mother (82%); disagreement in this case is very low. Also, a vast majority believes that a working mother can establish a relationship with her children that is equally warm and secure as in the case of a mother who does not work.


On the other hand, there is a lot of concern about the strain that reconciling career with family life generates, especially for families with very small children. The majority thinks that preschoolers are likely to suffer if their mother works, while many believe that family life suffers as a result of the woman pursuing a full-time career.





There do not seem to be big differences between men and women in respect of these opinions, the only significant difference being that women agree less with the idea that family life suffers when the woman holds a full-time job.




Polish society at large supports equality in the workplace understood as equal access to jobs for men and women. Many reject the notion that when jobs are scarce, men should have more right to be employed than women. Likewise, there is widespread rejection of the idea that men are better suited to be managers than women.




While men tend to agree with the idea that men are better suited for managerial positions than women, women strongly disagree. Society supports undertaking measures to eradicate gender inequalities in the job market. A great majority thinks that current law should be applied rigorously: that the courts ought to be more active in making sure women and men are paid the same wages for the same job. Opinions are divided with regard to policies, such as affirmative action and positive discrimination. An almost equal number agrees and disagrees with the statement that when hiring, women should be given priority over men in jobs where few women are employed.




Women are slightly more supportive of measures designed to improve their position in the workplace compared to men, but the differences are negligible.



Both men and women believe strongly in different masculine and feminine lifestyles. Virtually everyone supports the proposition that it is very important for men to act and dress like men and women to act and dress like women. A great majority dislikes men acting like women and women acting like men. These ideas impact personal dress codes: a strong majority takes it as quite important whether clothes give you a masculine or feminine look.




Men are more gender-conscious when it comes to style. Their agreement with each proposition is greater than women's. Apparently, "effeminate men" and "masculine women" carry a strong stigma among Poles in general and Polish men in particular.



Michał Wenzel

MUSIC TASTES

Various international studies have shown differences across social classes, occupational groups, and educational groups in the kinds of music people like. The differences between age groups and generations are also obviously important. What matters most in such cultural tastes among Poles now class or generation? We also wondered, if partisans of different political parties preferred to dance to different tunes.




First, let's simply look at which types of music are popular, which are not, and which are not well known by many people. Polish folk, feast, gypsy, pop, and disco polo (at least last year) were most widely liked, with Latin-American and classical music also being relatively well liked. Heavy metal, punk rock, techno, hip-hop, rap jazz and opera were the most widely and strongly disliked.

Second, we examined which kinds of music “group together,” in the sense that people who like one type are likely to like another. There are many complicated ways to look at this, but here we simplify some general conclusions. We asked about 27 specific types of music, but let's consider only 17 types which were familiar to a large percentage of respondents. These 17 types fell into 3 to 5 groups, depending how much you want to simplify the story. Let's discuss a solution with four groups. The first group could be called a popular, folk, mass category this group includes feast music, gypsy, Polish folk, disco-polo, and international folk. The second includes a diverse group non-traditional and not so “young” blues, rock, Latin American, pop, country, and jazz. The third group is classical and melodic classical music, opera, and church music. The fourth group is clearly young generational music rap and hip-hop. Some specific types of music “went-with” more than one group. Musicals were grouped with groups 1, 2, and 3. Jazz went with group 3, as well as with 2. And, pop went with both groups 2 and 4.

Now, let us consider the question of what characteristics divide Poles with regard to their music tastes. The answer is complicated because the determinants of taste are quite different for specific types of music. Nevertheless we can report some overall straightforward conclusions. Age is by far the biggest basis for differences in Polish music tastes. A number of types of music are very strongly related to age, and it is these types of music where you can most easily predict tastes. For one set of types of music, the older you are, the more you like them; this is most true of Polish folk, and nearly as true of Gypsy and feast music. For another set of music types, the younger you are, the more you like them, and the older you are the more you dislike them. This is most true of techno, hip-hop, pop, and rock. For these types of music, education, where you live, your sex, how religious you are, and which political party you like may make a little difference, but nothing makes a difference like age.

Educational level is the second most important factor, but it is a distant second. It has a significant effect mainly for the types of music that are not so age-determined or which are not so well known. These are: classical, blues, opera, swing, jazz, rhythm and blues, gospel, and world.



Whether you live in Warsaw or a village, your sex, and how religious you are do have small significant effects on some specific types of music, but they are much less important than age and education. Political preferences differentiate music tastes even less.

Albert Simkus, Michał Wenzel

NOTE: NORPOL PROJECT STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION

NORPOL was structured around two interdependent components. One was support for the historically important *POLPAN* project. This unique "panel" study of a national sample of Poles first interviewed in 1988 (originally about 5000, later a sub-sample of approximately 2000 adult respondents) had concerned a broad range of questions related to stratification, politics and other social, as well as psychological issues. The same sample of respondents was re-interviewed at five-year intervals, in 1993, 1998, and 2003. Not many surveys have managed to re-interview the same individuals, few indeed involving attitudes in addition to such "objective" variables as jobs and incomes. *POLPAN* is the only national panel survey involving attitudinal variables spanning pre- and post-state-socialist times in any country. Budgetary difficulties put the 2003 *POLPAN* wave of re-interviews in jeopardy. This was where *NORPOL* came in: it provided the opportunity for sharing approximately one-third to one-half of project funding with associated institutes in Poland for the express purpose of continuing

and extending this unique research and its resulting database. The *POLPAN* panel survey was designed and conducted by the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, the Polish Academy of Sciences.

The other project component, referred to as *POLTEST*, was methodological in the sense that, besides gathering new data on Polish attitudes and opinions, it contributed to an understanding of what our measures of substance really meant. Did people's answers change substantially from month to month, across a year or across five years? Did asking the same people the same questions over and over affect their answers? *POLTEST* was not about specific questions, but about the consistency of answers to different kinds of questions over different periods of time. It also replicated some questions from *POLPAN* to see whether the fact that *POLPAN* respondents were interviewed over a period of fifteen years might itself have influenced their answers. The essence of this part of the project was a very special panel survey, repeated on the same sample the first time after one month and the second time after one year (in 2003 and 2004). With exception of some electoral research, there are very few, if any, known socio-political panel surveys repeated after one month. Our assumption was that the external situation had not changed sufficiently in one month to affect people's opinions and attitudes, thus the instability of short term results stemmed from low response quality and should be interpreted differently than long-term instability. Assessing short and long term response stability was the chief objective of this part of the research project.

A major problem inherent to the analysis of attitudes of various groups is that some of them, although quite important, can be very small. Obtaining and comparing accurate measures on such small populations like, for example, supporters of less popular political parties, cultural, political or economic elites, small ethnic or religious minorities, specific age or occupational groups can prove to be quite difficult. For this reason, *POLTEST* culminated with a separate survey of an unusually large sample size (more than 4000). In this survey, conducted in 2005, we used what we learned were the best questions in the three previous waves of the *POLTEST* panel. *POLTEST* surveys were designed jointly by Polish and Norwegian researchers, all of whom have contributed to the present issue of *Polish Public Opinion*. The fieldwork was carried out by CBOS.

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